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As vehicle emissions regulations become increasingly stringent, there is a growing need to accurately model aftertreatment systems to aid in the development of ultra-low NOx vehicles. Common solutions to this problem include the development of complex chemical models or expansive neural networks. This paper aims to present the development process of a simpler Selective Catalytic Reduction (SCR) conversion efficiency Simulink model for the purposes of modeling tail pipe NOx emission levels based on various inputs, temperature shifts and SCR locations, arrangements and/or sizes in the system. The main objective is to utilize this model to predict tail pipe NOx emissions of the EPA Federal Test Procedures for heavy-duty vehicles. The model presented within is focused exclusively on heavy-duty application compression ignition engines and their corresponding aftertreatment setups.

In the past, research on blockchain technology has addressed security and privacy concerns within intelligent transportation systems for critical V2I and V2V communications that form the backbone of Internet of Vehicles. Within trucking industry, a recent trend has been observed towards the use of blockchain technology for operations. Industry stakeholders are particularly looking forward to refining status quo contract management and vehicle maintenance processes through blockchains. However, the use of blockchain technology for enhancing vehicle performance in fleets, especially while considering the fact that modern-day intelligent vehicles are prone to cyber security threats, is an area that has attracted less attention. In this paper, we demonstrate a case study that makes use of blockchains to securely optimize the fuel economy of fleets that do package pickup and delivery (P&D) in urban areas.

The lack of inherent security controls makes traditional Controller Area Network (CAN) buses vulnerable to Machine-In-The-Middle (MitM) cybersecurity attacks. Conventional vehicular MitM attacks involve tampering with the hardware to directly manipulate CAN bus traffic. We show, however, that MitM attacks can be realized without direct tampering of any CAN hardware. Our demonstration leverages how diagnostic applications based on RP1210 are vulnerable to Machine-In-The-Middle attacks. Test results show SAE J1939 communications, including single frame and multi-framed broadcast and on-request messages, are susceptible to data manipulation attacks where a shim DLL is used as a Machine-In-The-Middle. The demonstration shows these attacks can manipulate data that may mislead vehicle operators into taking the wrong actions.