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ISO 26262 is the actual standard for Functional Safety of automotive E/E (Electric/Electronic) systems. One of the challenges in the application of the standard is the distribution of safety related activities among the participants in the supply chain. In this paper, the concept of a Safety Element out of Context (SEooC) development will be analyzed showing its current problematic aspects and difficulties in implementing such an approach in a concrete typical automotive development flow with different participants (e.g. from OEM, tier 1 to semiconductor supplier) in the supply chain. The discussed aspects focus on the functional safety requirements of generic hardware and software development across the supply chain where the final integration of the developed element is not known at design time and therefore an assumption based mechanism shall be used.

The German funded project ARAMiS included work on several demonstrators one of which was a multicore approach on large scale software integration (LSSI) for the automotive domain. Here BMW and Audi intentionally implemented two different integration platforms to gain both experience and real life data on a Hypervisor based concept on one side as well as using only native AUTOSAR-based methods on the other side for later comparison. The idea was to obtain figures on the added overhead both for multicore as well as safety, based on practical work and close-to-production implementations. During implementation and evaluation on one hand there were a lot of valuable lessons learned about multicore in conjunction with safety. On the other hand valuable information was gathered to make it finally possible to set up a cost model for estimation of potential overhead generated by different integration approaches for safety related software functions.

The trend towards even more sophisticated driver assistance systems and growing automation of driving sets new requirements for the robustness and availability of the involved automotive systems. In case of an error, today it is still sufficient that safety related systems just fail safe or silent to prevent safety related influence of the driving stability resulting in a functional deactivation. But the reliance on passive mechanical fallbacks in which the human driver taking over control, being inevitable in such a scenario, is expected to get more and more insufficient along with a rising degree of driving automation as the driver will be given longer reaction time. The advantage of highly or even fully automated driving is that the driver can focus on other tasks than controlling the car and monitoring it’s behavior and environment.