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The safety of commercial aviation industry has come under extensive scrutiny and how the system safety process is applied. One specific system safety regulation concerns how unsafe system operating conditions are meeting regulatory requirements. Minimal regulatory guidance was available on this topic and an industry committee (American Society for Testing of Materials) decided to provide a consensus standard with input from a cross-section of airplane manufacturers, suppliers, and regulatory authorities on what is meant by an unsafe system operating condition and how compliance can be shown to the regulation(s). The committee determined that an unsafe system operating condition is when a failure condition severity increases (to hazardous or catastrophic) due to crewmember(s) inaction. For example, if a hazard has occurred it is possible the severity can increase to an unacceptable level as the crewmember(s) are not aware of the hazard.

Aerospace Recommended Practice (ARP) 4754 Revision A (ARP4754A), Guidelines for Development of Civil Aircraft and Systems [1], and ARP4761, Guidelines and Methods for Conducting the Safety Assessment Process on Civil Airborne Systems and Equipment [2], together describe a complex set of intertwining processes which comprehensively prioritize development activities for a product's systems based on their safety criticality. These processes work at specific levels of detail (aircraft and system) and interact with a set of processes at lower levels of detail (item) defined by Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics (RTCA) standards. The aircraft and system development process (ARP4754A) supplies functions, requirements, and architectural definitions to the System Safety process (ARP4761), which in turn supplies Development Assurance Levels back to the development process and on to the RTCA processes.