Search Results

Ultra reliable space life support systems can be built with small additional mass for direct material supply or about twice the minimum mass for recycling equipment. The required direct supply of a material such as oxygen, water, or food for space life support can be provided in some number “r” of identical packages. If only one of the r packages fails, the life support system fails. But by providing n > r packages, so that there are n - r spare packages to make up for failures, the reliability of direct material supply can be greatly increased. Ultra reliability can be achieved if the required direct supply is provided in 10 to 100 or more packages with 1 or 2 spare packages, so the additional mass required for ultra reliable direct life support is only a few percent.

To facilitate analysis, Advanced Life Support (ALS) systems are often assumed to be linear and time invariant, but they usually have important nonlinear and dynamic aspects. This paper reviews nonlinear models applicable to ALS. Nonlinear dynamic behavior can be caused by time varying inputs, changes in system parameters, nonlinear system functions, closed loop feedback delays, and limits on buffer storage or processing rates. Dynamic models are usually cataloged according to the number of state variables. The simplest dynamic models are linear, using only integration, multiplication, addition, and subtraction of the state variables. A general linear model with only two state variables can produce all the possible dynamic behavior of linear systems with many state variables, including stability, oscillation, or exponential growth and decay. Linear systems can be described using mathematical analysis.

Dynamic simulation of the lunar outpost habitat life support was undertaken to investigate the impact of life support failures and to investigate possible responses. Some preparatory static analysis for the Lunar Outpost life support model, an earlier version of the model, and an investigation into the impact of Extravehicular Activity (EVA) were reported previously. (Jones, 2008-01-2184, 2008-01-2017) The earlier model was modified to include possible resupply delays, power failures, recycling system failures, and atmosphere and other material storage failures. Most failures impact the lunar outpost water balance and can be mitigated by reducing water usage. Food solids and nitrogen can be obtained only by resupply from Earth. The most time urgent failure is a loss of carbon dioxide removal capability. Life support failures might be survivable if effective operational solutions are provided in the system design.

This study introduces several new concepts for suited EVA astronaut ingress/egress (departure and return) from a pressurized planetary surface habitat, based on use of a rear-entry suit and a suit lock or suitport. We provide insight into key operational aspects and integration issues, as well as the results of a requirements analysis and risk assessment of the concepts. The risk assessment included hazard analysis, hazard mitigation techniques, failure mode assessment, and operational risk assessment. Also included are performance and mass estimates for the egress concepts, and concepts for integration of the egress concepts with potential planetary habitat designs.

Space projects are spectacular, costly, and highly visible. Their occasional failures receive extensive analysis and explanation. This paper reviews studies of failures of crewed and uncrewed missions. The explanations of these space project failures include simple oversight errors, poor project management, complex combinations of unforeseen events, and conceptual flaws that prohibited success. Failures are usually found to be caused by project management errors, based on the reasoning that the project manager and team members had the capability and responsibility to avoid them. These failure causes are well known. Why do so many projects make the same mistakes?