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The aerospace and automotive electronic systems are getting more complex and/or highly integrated, as defined by ARP 4754A, making extensive use of microelectronics and digital memories which, in turn, operates in higher frequencies and lower voltages. In addition, the aircraft are flying in higher altitudes, and polar routes are getting more frequent. These factors raise the probability of occurrence of hazardous effects like the Single Event Upsets in their embedded electronic systems. These must be designed in a way to tolerate and assure the immunity to the Single Event Upsets, based upon criteria such as reliability, availability and criticality. This paper proposes an overview of an assurance process of immunity of embedded electronic systems to Single Event Upsets caused by ionizing particles by means of a review of literature and an analysis of standards as ECSS-E-ST-10-1, NASA Single Event Effects Criticality Analysis and IEC TS 62396-1.

In this work, the problem of fault detection, isolation, and reconfiguration (FDIR) for Networked-Control Systems (NCS) of aerospace vehicles is discussed. The concept of fault-tolerance is introduced from a generic structure, and a review on quantitative and qualitative methods (state estimation, parameter estimation, parity space, statistic testing, neural networks, etc.) for FDIR is then performed. Afterwards, the use of networks as loop-closing elements is introduced, followed by a discussion on advantages (flexibility, energy demand, etc.) and challenges (networks effects on performance, closed-loop fault-effects on safety, etc.) represented thereby. Finally, examples of applications on aerospace vehicles illustrate the importance of the discussion herein exposed.