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The UN R155 regulation is the first automotive cyber security regulation and has made security a mandatory approval criterion for new vehicle types. This establishes internationally harmonized security requirements for market approval. As a result, the application of the regulation presents manufacturers and suppliers with the challenge of demonstrating compliance. At process level the implementation of a Cyber Security Management System (CSMS) is required while at product level, the Threat Assessment and Risk Analysis (TARA) forms the basis to identify relevant threats and corresponding mitigation strategies. Overall, an issued type approval is internationally recognized by the member states of the UN 1958 Agreement. International recognition implies that uniform assessment criteria are applied to demonstrate compliance and to decide whether security efforts are sufficient.

Consequently, rise of this technological trend is bringing forth safety and cybersecurity challenges in form of new threats, hazards and vulnerabilities. As per the recent UN vehicle regulation 155, several risk-based security models and assessment frameworks have been proposed to counter the growing cybersecurity issues, however, the high budgetary cost to develop the tool and train personnel along with high risk of leakage of trade secrets, hinders the automotive manufacturers from adapting these third party solutions. ...As per the recent UN vehicle regulation 155, several risk-based security models and assessment frameworks have been proposed to counter the growing cybersecurity issues, however, the high budgetary cost to develop the tool and train personnel along with high risk of leakage of trade secrets, hinders the automotive manufacturers from adapting these third party solutions.

This method's detailed approach ensures that cybersecurity requirements can be readily implemented as a part of feature design, addressing the concerns of feature owners directly. ...This paper will discuss the merits of asset based approach to cybersecurity over attack based recognizing the inherent strengths and limitations of both methods and underscores the need for a unified approach.

Classic vehicle production had limitations in bringing the driving commands to the actuators for vehicle motion (engine, steering and braking). Steering columns, hydraulic tubes or steel cables needed to be placed between the driver and actuator. Change began with the introduction of e-gas systems. Mechanical cables were replaced by thin, electric signal wires. The technical solutions and legal standardizations for addressing the steering and braking systems, were not defined at this time. Today, OEMs are starting E/E-Architecture transformations for manifold reasons and now have the chance to remove the long hydraulic tubes for braking and the solid metal columns used for steering. X-by-wire is the way forward and allows for higher Autonomous Driving (AD) levels for automated driving vehicles. This offers new opportunities to design the vehicle in-cabin space. This paper will start with the introduction of x-by-wire technologies.

The separation of cybersecurity considerations in RMTO is barely considered, as so far, most available research and activities are mainly focused on AV. ...The main focus of this paper is addressing RMTO cybersecurity utilising an adaptable security-by-design approach, although security-by-design is still in the infant state within automotive cybersecurity. ...The main focus of this paper is addressing RMTO cybersecurity utilising an adaptable security-by-design approach, although security-by-design is still in the infant state within automotive cybersecurity. An adaptable security-by-design approach for RMTO covers Security Engineering Life-cycle, Logical Security Layered Concept, and Security Architecture.

Additional complicating factors, such as cybersecurity concerns combined with a first responder’s legal authority, may pose challenges for traditional data collection.

As a result of the ever-increasing application of cyber-physical components in the automotive industry, cybersecurity has become an urgent topic. Adapting technologies and communication protocols like Ethernet and WiFi in connected vehicles yields many attack scenarios. ...Consequently, ISO/SAE 21434 and UN R155 (2021) define a standard and regulatory framework for automotive cybersecurity, Both documents follow a risk management-based approach and require a threat modeling methodology for risk analysis and identification. ...Initially, we transform cybersecurity guidelines to attack trees, and then we use their formal interpretations to assess the vehicle’s design.

To build secure systems of road vehicles, the cybersecurity engineering standard ISO21434[11] suggests the evaluation of vulnerabilities throughout engineering process, such as attack path analysis, system requirement stage, software architecture, design, and implementation and testing phases. ...With my analysis and practices, it is appropriate to include the common vulnerabilities that ought to be an integral part of the automotive cybersecurity engineering process. In this paper, the author would like to provide a list of vulnerabilities that might be a suggestion for threat analysis and risk assessment and propose two solutions that may be adopted directly in the V-model for security-relevant software development.

With the rapid development of connected and autonomous vehicles, more sophisticated automotive systems running large portions of software and implementing a variety of communication interfaces are being developed. The ever-expanding codebase increases the risk for software vulnerabilities, while at the same time the large number of communication interfaces make the systems more susceptible to be targeted by attackers. As such, it is of utmost importance for automotive organizations to identify potential vulnerabilities early and continuously in the development lifecycle in an automated manner. In this paper, we suggest a practical approach for integrating fuzz testing into a Continuous Integration (CI) pipeline for automotive systems. As a first step, we have performed a Threat Analysis and Risk Assessment (TARA) of a general E/E architecture to identify high-risk interfaces and functions.

Additionally, we go beyond the attack vectors listed in UN-R155 - using our own analysis, experience and insights, we explored other attack vectors that will also affect vehicle cybersecurity.

In agriculture industry, increasing use of Vehicle Internet of Things (IoT), telematics and emerging technologies are resulting in smarter machines with connected solutions. Inter and Intra Communication with vehicle to vehicle and inside vehicle - Electronic Control Unit (ECU) to ECU or ECU (Electronic Control Unit) to sensor, requirement for flow of data increased in-turn resulting in increased need for secure communication. In this paper, we focus on functional verification and validation of secure Controller Area Network (CAN) for intra vehicular communication to establish confidentiality, integrity, authenticity, and freshness of data, supporting safety, advanced automation, protection of sensitive data and IP (Intellectual Property) protection. Network security algorithms and software security processes are the layers supporting to achieve our cause.

As well, functional safety and cybersecurity constraints will increase. Electrification implies replacing energy from thermal sources with electricity from the wall and will include enhanced integration between sub-systems and components, along with higher speed in real time controls.

The underlying systems are susceptible to safety and cybersecurity attacks as the involved ECUs are interconnected. The security attacks can lead to disrupting the safe operation of the vehicle while causing injury to the passengers. ...Consequently, the functional safety requirements and cybersecurity requirements can be aligned with each other. In this article, a case study of the application of the THARA framework is presented through the risk analysis of safety and security threats applicable to the rearview camera (RVC) feature of the vehicle.

Here, we discuss the On-Board Diagnostic (OBD) regulations for next generation BEV/HEV, its vulnerabilities and cybersecurity threats that come with hacking. We propose three cybersecurity attack detection and defense methods: Cyber-Attack detection algorithm, Time-Based CAN Intrusion Detection Method and, Feistel Cipher Block Method. ...These control methods autonomously diagnose a cybersecurity problem in a vehicle’s onboard system using an OBD interface, such as OBD-II when a fault caused by a cyberattack is detected, All of this is achieved in an internal communication network structure.

Therefore, modern cybersecurity validation is highly stressed for finding security vulnerabilities and robustness issues early and systematically at every stage of the product development process. ...The integration of a sophisticated fuzz testing program within the overall cybersecurity validation strategy allows for accommodating towards these challenging demands. In this paper, we review a general automotive cybersecurity engineering process containing functional testing, vulnerability scanning and penetration testing, and highlight shortcomings that can be complemented by fuzz testing. ...In this paper, we review a general automotive cybersecurity engineering process containing functional testing, vulnerability scanning and penetration testing, and highlight shortcomings that can be complemented by fuzz testing.

What standardization is needed to ensure that quantum technologies do not pose an unacceptable risk from an automotive cybersecurity perspective? Click here to access the full SAE EDGETM Research Report portfolio.

Its extensive application of data networks, including enhanced external digital communication, forced the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), for the first time, to set “Special Conditions” for cybersecurity. In the 15 years that ensued, airworthiness regulation followed suit, and all key rule-, regulation-, and standard-making organizations weighed in to establish a new airworthiness cybersecurity superset of legislation, regulation, and standardization. ...In the 15 years that ensued, airworthiness regulation followed suit, and all key rule-, regulation-, and standard-making organizations weighed in to establish a new airworthiness cybersecurity superset of legislation, regulation, and standardization. The resulting International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) resolutions, US and European Union (EU) legislations, FAA and European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) regulations, and the DO-326/ED-202 set of standards are already the de-facto, and soon becoming the official, standards for legislation, regulation, and best practices, with the FAA already mandating it to a constantly growing extent for a few years now—and EASA adopting the set in its entirety in July 2020.

Automotive safety is always the focus of consumers, the selling point of products, the focus of technology. In order to achieve automatic driving, interconnection with the outside world, human-automatic system interaction, the security connotation of intelligent and connected vehicles (ICV) changes: information security is the basis of its security. Functional safety ensures that the system is operating properly. Behavioral safety guarantees a secure interaction between people and vehicles. Passive security should not be weakened, but should be strengthened based on new constraints. In terms of information safety, the threshold for attacking cloud, pipe, and vehicle information should be raised to ensure that ICV system does not fail due to malicious attacks. The cloud is divided into three cloud platforms according to functions: ICVs private cloud, TSP cloud, public cloud.

The paper includes a description of cybersecurity measures to protect the vehicle against malicious attacks.

The caveat to these additional capabilities is issues like cybersecurity, complexity, etc. This paper is an exploration into FuSa and CAVs and will present a systematic approach to understand challenges and propose potential framework, Intelligent Vehicle Monitoring for Safety and Security (IVMSS) to handle faults/malfunctions in CAVs, and specifically autonomous systems.