Search Results

The purpose of this SAE Aerospace Information Report (AIR) is to provide guidance for aircraft engine and propeller systems (hereafter referred to as propulsion systems) certification for cybersecurity. Compliance for cybersecurity requires that the engine control, propeller control, monitoring system, and all auxiliary equipment systems and networks associated with the propulsion system (such as nacelle systems, overspeed governors, and thrust reversers) be protected from intentional unauthorized electronic interactions (IUEI) that may result in an adverse effect on the safety of the propulsion system or the airplane.

Its extensive application of data networks, including enhanced external digital communication, forced the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), for the first time, to set “Special Conditions” for cybersecurity. In the 15 years that ensued, airworthiness regulation followed suit, and all key rule-, regulation-, and standard-making organizations weighed in to establish a new airworthiness cybersecurity superset of legislation, regulation, and standardization. ...In the 15 years that ensued, airworthiness regulation followed suit, and all key rule-, regulation-, and standard-making organizations weighed in to establish a new airworthiness cybersecurity superset of legislation, regulation, and standardization. The resulting International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) resolutions, US and European Union (EU) legislations, FAA and European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) regulations, and the DO-326/ED-202 set of standards are already the de-facto, and soon becoming the official, standards for legislation, regulation, and best practices, with the FAA already mandating it to a constantly growing extent for a few years now—and EASA adopting the set in its entirety in July 2020.

Additionally, we go beyond the attack vectors listed in UN-R155 - using our own analysis, experience and insights, we explored other attack vectors that will also affect vehicle cybersecurity.

Due to the rapid development in the technological aspect of the autonomous vehicle (AV), there is a compelling need for research in the field vehicle efficiency and emission reduction without affecting the performance, safety and reliability of the vehicle. Electric vehicle (EV) with rechargeable battery has been proved to be a practical solution for the above problem. In order to utilize the maximum capacity of the battery, a proper power management and control mechanism need to be developed such that it does not affect the performance, reliability and safety of vehicle. Different optimization techniques along with deterministic dynamic programming (DDP) approach are used for the power distribution and management control. The battery-operated electric vehicle can be recharged either by plug-in a wired connection or by the inductive mean (i.e. wirelessly) with the help of the electromagnetic field energy.

Connected commercial vehicles bring cybersecurity to the fore Connectivity, automation and electrification will drive vehicle development in the near future, say industry experts attending the revamped SAE COMVEC 17 event.

To serve and protect As cars become more connected and automated, cybersecurity concerns are rising. Industry engineers have many tools and techniques and are now deploying encryption and standards to ensure that vehicle controls are not altered or usurped by unauthorized people.

Symbolic code execution is a powerful cybersecurity testing approach that facilitates the systematic exploration of all paths within a program to uncover previously unknown cybersecurity vulnerabilities. ...Symbolic code execution is a powerful cybersecurity testing approach that facilitates the systematic exploration of all paths within a program to uncover previously unknown cybersecurity vulnerabilities. This is achieved through a Satisfiability Modulo Theory (SMT) solver, which operates on symbolic values for program inputs instead of using their concrete counterparts.

We also analyze how useful Cybersecurity Assurance Levels (CAL) are in this process and how quantitative as well as qualitative metrics can be utilized as evidence.

Innovations in Mobility: Aerospace Digital Summitaerospace mobility leaders convene leverage cutting-edge technology, design, develop safety measures, integrate current regulations, suggest future policies, expand markets, diversify revenue streams.

Access mechanisms to system data and/or control is a primary use case of the hardware protected security environment (hardware protected security environment) during different uses and stages of the system. The hardware protected security environment acts as a gatekeeper for these use cases and not necessarily as the executor of the function. This section is a generalization of such use cases in an attempt to extract common requirements for the hardware protected security environment that enable it to be a gatekeeper. Examples are: Creating a new key fob Re-flashing ECU firmware Reading/exporting PII out of the ECU Using a subscription-based feature Performing some service on an ECU Transferring ownership of the vehicle Some of these examples are discussed later in this section and some have detailed sections of their own. This list is by no means comprehensive.

Abstract This work introduces the concept of a dual-layer specification structure for standards that separate interoperability functions, such as backward compatibility, localization, and deployment, from those essential to reliability, security, and functionality. The latter group of features, which constitute the actual standard, make up the baseline layer for instructions, while all the elements required for interoperability are specified in a second layer, known as a Protocols, Operations, Usage, and Formats (POUF) document. We applied this technique in the development of a standard for Uptane [1], a security framework for over-the-air (OTA) software updates used in many automobiles. This standard is a good candidate for a dual-layer specification because it requires communication between entities, but does not require a specific format for this communication.

Abstract In the automotive domain, the evolution of electrical and electronic (E/E) architecture trend is toward consolidating multiple heterogeneous applications executing on individual devices onto a centralized powerful computing platform. Many forums debate the nature of this centralized computing platform. At least for another decade, automotive powertrain functions will continue their development on a multicore controller platform (MCU) instead of many core processors. Data security and the need to meet Automotive Safety Integrity Level D (ASIL-D)-compliant powertrain functions are some of the reasons for this preference. For the centralized computing platform, virtualizing the underlying MCU will facilitate the simultaneous execution of heterogeneous powertrain applications with guaranteed spatial and temporal isolation. A common problem in virtualizing the MCU is the sharing of peripherals, which are comparatively scarce.

Software vulnerability management is one of the most critical and crucial security techniques, which analyzes the automotive software/firmware across the digital cockpit, ADAS, V2X, etc. domains for vulnerabilities, and provides security patches for the concerned Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE). The process of automotive SW/FW vulnerability management system between the OEMs and vendors happen through a channel of fixing a certain number of vulnerabilities by 1st tier supplier which needs to be verified in front of OEMs for the fixed number and type of patches in there deliverable SW/FW. The gap of verification between for the fixed patches between the OEMs and 1st tier supplier requires a reliable human independent intelligent technique to have a trustworthiness of verification.

This document describes a set of recommended actions to take to increase the likelihood of safe vehicle operation when a device (external test equipment, data collection device, etc.) whose normal operation has been compromised by a source external to the vehicle is connected to the vehicle’s diagnostic system. The term “diagnostic system” is intended to be a generic way to reference all the different ways that diagnostic commands might be injected into the system. The guidance in this document is intended to improve security without significantly impacting the ability for franchised dealer or independent aftermarket external test tools to perform legitimate diagnosis and maintenance functions. The goal is that intrusive services are only allowed to be performed when the vehicle is in a Safe State such that even if the intrusive service were to be initiated with adversarial intent the consequences of such a service would still be acceptable.

Abstract The importance of in-vehicle network security has increased with an increase in automated and connected vehicles. Hence, many attacks and countermeasures have been proposed to secure the controller area network (CAN), which is an existent in-vehicle network protocol. At the same time, new protocols-such as FlexRay and Ethernet-which are faster and more reliable than CAN have also been proposed. European OEMs have adopted FlexRay as a control network that can perform the fundamental functions of a vehicle. However, there are few studies regarding FlexRay security. In particular, studies on attacks against FlexRay are limited to theoretical studies or simulation-based experiments. Hence, the vulnerability of FlexRay is unclear. Understanding this vulnerability is necessary for the application of countermeasures and improving the security of future vehicles. In this article, we highlight the vulnerability of FlexRay found in the experiments conducted on a real FlexRay network.

Abstract The innovations of vehicle connectivity have been increasing dramatically to enhance the safety and user experience of driving, while the rising numbers of interfaces to the external world also bring security threats to vehicles. Many security countermeasures have been proposed and discussed to protect the systems and services against attacks. To provide an overview of the current states in this research field, we conducted a systematic mapping study (SMS) on the topic area “security countermeasures of in-vehicle communication systems.” A total of 279 papers are identified based on the defined study identification strategy and criteria. We discussed four research questions (RQs) related to the security countermeasures, validation methods, publication patterns, and research trends and gaps based on the extracted and classified data. Finally, we evaluated the validity threats and the whole mapping process.

This document describes some of the actions that should be taken to help ensure safe vehicle operation in the case that any such connected device (external test equipment, connected data collection device) has been compromised by a source external to the vehicle. In particular, this document describes those actions specifically related to SAE J1979, ISO 15765, and ISO 14229 standardized diagnostic services. Generally, the following forms of communication bus connection topologies are used in current vehicles: a Open access to communication buses b Communication buses isolated via a gateway c Hybrid combinations of a. and b.

Finding success on an international track Student members of the University of Missouri's Formula SAE team are learning firsthand that international collaboration is the future of engineering. A vision. A car. A cause. New Mexico State Aggies are tough enough to race pink. CyberAuto Challenge helps close talent gap Having a supply of high-quality young engineers is key to beefing up the automotive industry's cyber defenses.

Truck Tech War! Ford, GM, and Ram arm their profit-pumping half-ton pickups for the 2020s' efficiency battle. Mobility mecca: WCX 2018 Provocative thought leaders, emerging disruptors, and the industry's best networking and career guidance all under one big roof: the 2018 SAE World Congress Experience is coming April 10-12. Mercedes adopts Harman UX for A-Class The 'smart' architecture is capable of OTA updates and features more-accurate voice recognition. Spark of genius Mazda's Skyactiv-X-the nexus of gasoline and diesel tech-remains on track for 2019 production. We test-drive recent prototypes to check development status. Taking aim at the drowsy-driver threat Hyundai Mobis is leveraging Level 4 tech to move 'departed' drivers safely off the road. Editorial: Fear and loathing on the path to Level 4 driving Supplier Eye Variability, risk and the value stream The Navigator How will automated vehicles deal with potholes?

Advancing toward driverless cars Autonomous-driving technology is set to revolutionize the auto industry. But getting to a true "driverless" future will be an iterative process based on merging numerous individual innovations. Overcoming the challenges of HCCI combustion Homogenous-charge compression ignition (HCCI) holds considerable promise to unlock new IC-engine efficiencies. But HCCI's advantages bring engineering obstacles, particularly emissions control. Simulation for tractor cabin vibroacoustic optimization Method of identifying and stopping an electronically controlled diesel engine in runaway mode Electrification not a one-size-fits-all solution Efforts in the off-highway industry have been under way for decades, but electrification technology still faces implementation challenges. 700 miles, hands-free! GM's Super Cruise turns Cadillac drivers into passengers in a well-engineered first step toward greater vehicle autonomy.