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This recommended practice provides guidance on vehicle Cybersecurity and was created based off of, and expanded on from, existing practices which are being implemented or reported in industry, government and conference papers. ...Other proprietary Cybersecurity development processes and standards may have been established to support a specific manufacturer’s development processes, and may not be comprehensively represented in this document, however, information contained in this document may help refine existing in-house processes, methods, etc. ...This recommended practice establishes a set of high-level guiding principles for Cybersecurity as it relates to cyber-physical vehicle systems. This includes: Defining a complete lifecycle process framework that can be tailored and utilized within each organization’s development processes to incorporate Cybersecurity into cyber-physical vehicle systems from concept phase through production, operation, service, and decommissioning.

This recommended practice provides guidance on vehicle Cybersecurity and was created based off of, and expanded on from, existing practices which are being implemented or reported in industry, government and conference papers. ...Other proprietary Cybersecurity development processes and standards may have been established to support a specific manufacturer’s development processes, and may not be comprehensively represented in this document, however, information contained in this document may help refine existing in-house processes, methods, etc. ...This recommended practice establishes a set of high-level guiding principles for Cybersecurity as it relates to cyber-physical vehicle systems. This includes: Defining a complete lifecycle process framework that can be tailored and utilized within each organization’s development processes to incorporate Cybersecurity into cyber-physical vehicle systems from concept phase through production, operation, service, and decommissioning.

SAE is developing a number of standards, including the SAE J2945/x and SAE J3161/x series, that specify a set of applications using message sets from the SAE J2735 data dictionary. (“Application” is used here to mean “a collection of activities including interactions between different entities in the service of a collection of related goals and associated with a given IEEE Provider Service Identifier (PSID)”). Authenticity and integrity of the communications for these applications are ensured using digital signatures and IEEE 1609.2 digital certificates, which also indicate the permissions of the senders using Provider Service Identifiers (PSIDs) and Service Specific Permissions (SSPs). The PSID is a globally unique identifier associated with an application specification that unambiguously describes how to build interoperable instances of that application.

Access mechanisms to system data and/or control is a primary use case of the hardware protected security environment (hardware protected security environment) during different uses and stages of the system. The hardware protected security environment acts as a gatekeeper for these use cases and not necessarily as the executor of the function. This section is a generalization of such use cases in an attempt to extract common requirements for the hardware protected security environment that enable it to be a gatekeeper. Examples are: Creating a new key fob Re-flashing ECU firmware Reading/exporting PII out of the ECU Using a subscription-based feature Performing some service on an ECU Transferring ownership of the vehicle Some of these examples are discussed later in this section and some have detailed sections of their own. This list is by no means comprehensive.

Connected vehicles can provide data from multiple sensors that monitor both the vehicle and the environment through which the vehicle is passing. The data, when shared, can be used to enhance and optimize transportation operations and management—specifically, traffic flow and infrastructure maintenance. This document describes an interface between vehicle and infrastructure for collecting vehicle/probe data. That data may represent a single point in time or may be accumulated over defined periods of time or distance, or may be triggered based on circumstance. The purpose of this document is to define an interoperable means of collecting the vehicle/probe data in support of the use cases defined herein. There are many additional use cases that may be realized based on the interface defined in this document. Note that vehicle diagnostics are not included within the scope of this document, but diagnostics-related features may be added to probe data in a future supplemental document.

This document describes a set of recommended actions to take to increase the likelihood of safe vehicle operation when a device (external test equipment, data collection device, etc.) whose normal operation has been compromised by a source external to the vehicle is connected to the vehicle’s diagnostic system. The term “diagnostic system” is intended to be a generic way to reference all the different ways that diagnostic commands might be injected into the system. The guidance in this document is intended to improve security without significantly impacting the ability for franchised dealer or independent aftermarket external test tools to perform legitimate diagnosis and maintenance functions. The goal is that intrusive services are only allowed to be performed when the vehicle is in a Safe State such that even if the intrusive service were to be initiated with adversarial intent the consequences of such a service would still be acceptable.

This document applies to the development of Plans for integrating and managing COTS assemblies in electronic equipment and Systems for the commercial, military, and space markets; as well as other ADHP markets that wish to use this document. For purposes of this document, COTS assemblies are viewed as electronic assemblies such as printed wiring assemblies, relays, disk drives, LCD matrices, VME circuit cards, servers, printers, laptop computers, etc. There are many ways to categorize COTS assemblies1, including the following spectrum: At one end of the spectrum are COTS assemblies whose design, internal parts2, materials, configuration control, traceability, reliability, and qualification methods are at least partially controlled, or influenced, by ADHP customers (either individually or collectively). An example at this end of the spectrum is a VME circuit card assembly.

An ADS-operated vehicle’s operational design domain (ODD) is defined by the manufacturer based on numerous factors. Research is underway at other organizations to define and organize ODD elements into taxonomies and other relational constructs. In order to enhance collaboration and communication between manufacturers and developers and transportation authorities, common terms and consistent frameworks are needed. The conceptual framework presented by Automated Vehicle Safety Consortium establishes a lexicon that can be used consistently by ADS developers and manufacturers responsible for defining their ADS ODD. A common framework and lexicon will reduce confusion, align expectations, and therefore build public trust, acceptance, and confidence.

SMSOLUTIONS0123 represents the work of a team of policy and technical leaders from over a dozen forward-leaning organizations in the ground vehicle industry and government. When asked where Sustainable Mobility Solutions could best apply the capabilities SAE has developed over a century, the SMS group responded without hesitation: address EV charging system failure. The group determined to aggregate charging session data with the view to create a consistent data dictionary and analysis practice. Adopting agile work practices, it studied these data, vetting and iterating its solution with the objective of producing a technical report in approximately half the time required in normal standardization. The resulting document, EV Charging Infrastructure: Charging System Performance Reporting, is informing work by the U.S. Department of Energy and Departments of Energy and Transportation Joint Office, as well as OEMs and suppliers.