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A framework is defined that includes requirements for cybersecurity processes and a common language for communicating and managing cybersecurity risk. ...This document specifies engineering requirements for cybersecurity risk management regarding concept, product development, production, operation, maintenance and decommissioning of electrical and electronic (E/E) systems in road vehicles, including their components and interfaces. ...This document does not prescribe specific technology or solutions related to cybersecurity.

Strategies designed to deal with these challenges differ in the way in which added duties are assigned and cybersecurity topics are integrated into the already existing process steps. Cybersecurity requirements often clash with existing system requirements or established development methods, leading to low acceptance among developers, and introducing the need to have clear policies on how friction between cybersecurity and other fields is handled. ...Cybersecurity requirements often clash with existing system requirements or established development methods, leading to low acceptance among developers, and introducing the need to have clear policies on how friction between cybersecurity and other fields is handled. A cybersecurity development approach is frequently perceived as introducing impediments, that bear the risk of cybersecurity measures receiving a lower priority to reduce inconvenience. ...For an established development process and a team accustomed to this process, adding cybersecurity features to the product initially means inconvenience and reduced productivity without perceivable benefits.

A significant milestone in advancing cybersecurity within the automotive industry is the release of the first international standard for automotive cybersecurity ISO/SAE 21434:2021 ‘Road Vehicles — Cybersecurity Engineering’. A recently published type approval regulation for automotive cybersecurity (UN R155) is also tailored for member countries of the UNECE WP.29 alliance. ...Thus, the challenges for embedded automotive systems engineers are increasing while frameworks, tools and shared concepts for cybersecurity engineering and training are scarce. Hence, cybersecurity training in the automotive domain necessitates an understanding of domain-specific intricacies and the unique challenges at the intersection of cybersecurity and embedded systems engineering, elevating the need for improving the skill set and knowledge of automotive cybersecurity engineers. ...Hence, cybersecurity training in the automotive domain necessitates an understanding of domain-specific intricacies and the unique challenges at the intersection of cybersecurity and embedded systems engineering, elevating the need for improving the skill set and knowledge of automotive cybersecurity engineers. This paper delves into an automotive cybersecurity training concept aimed at enhancing the proficiency of development engineers.

Abstract Aircraft cybersecurity efforts have tended to focus at the strategic or tactical levels without a clear connection between the two. ...CSSEP’s process model postulates that security is best achieved by a balance of cybersecurity, cyber resiliency, defensibility, and recoverability and that control is best established by developing security constraints versus attempting to find every vulnerability. ...CSSEP identifies the major functions needed to do effective aircraft cybersecurity and provides a flexible framework as the “missing link” to connect the strategic and tactical levels of aircraft cybersecurity.

What standardization is needed to ensure that quantum technologies do not pose an unacceptable risk from an automotive cybersecurity perspective? Click here to access the full SAE EDGETM Research Report portfolio.

The VCE Laboratory testbeds are connected with an Amazon Web Services (AWS) cloud-based Cyber-security Labs as a Service (CLaaS) system, which allows students and researchers to access the testbeds from any place that has a secure internet connection. ...VCE students are assigned predefined virtual machines to perform designated cyber-security experiments. The CLaaS system has low administrative overhead associated with experiment setup and management. ...VCE Laboratory CLaaS experiments have been developed for demonstrating man-in-the-middle cyber-security attacks from actual compromised hardware or software connected with the TestCube.

A framework is defined that includes requirements for cybersecurity processes and a common language for communicating and managing cybersecurity risk. ...This document specifies requirements for cybersecurity risk management regarding engineering for concept, development, production, operation, maintenance, and decommissioning for road vehicle electrical and electronic (E/E) systems, including their components and interfaces. ...This document does not prescribe specific technology or solutions related to cybersecurity.

Argus, a global leader in automotive cybersecurity, has upgraded its stand-alone Fleet Protection backend platform and is now providing continuous live monitoring of both automotive and commercial aircraft fleets.

Therefore, engineers should ensure that systems are designed free of unreasonable risks to motor vehicle safety, including those that may result due to existence of potential cybersecurity vulnerabilities. The automotive industry is making vehicle cybersecurity an organizational priority.

Automotive cybersecurity issues are becoming more prominent than ever. SAE J3061 and ISO/SAE 21434 being drafted also indicate that automotive cybersecurity has been elevated to a position equal to or more important than functional safety. ...SAE J3061 and ISO/SAE 21434 being drafted also indicate that automotive cybersecurity has been elevated to a position equal to or more important than functional safety. ...Security threat analysis helps the development of the early concept phase of automotive cybersecurity. However, the threat analysis based on the traditional attack tree has the disadvantages of multiple subjective factors and low accuracy.

IOOs and ADS developers agree that cost, communications, interoperability, cybersecurity, operation, maintenance, and other issues undercut efforts to deploy a comprehensive connected infrastructure.

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Using a wireless medium for tractor-trailer communication will bring new cybersecurity challenges and requirements which requires new development and lifecycle considerations.

The article also focus on innovative approaches that have recently adopted my many cybersecurity professionals for secured operation of ITS involving block-chain, artificial intelligence, and Machine Learning.

This document addresses the development of security material for application specifications in SAE V2X Technical Committees. The assumption in this document is that two groups with distinct missions contribute to the development of each standard: the “Application Specification Team is in charge of specifying the application functionality and the “Security Specification Team” is in charge of specifying the security. The two teams may, of course, have a significant overlap of members.

SAE is developing a number of standards, including the SAE J2945/x and SAE J3161/x series, that specify a set of applications using message sets from the SAE J2735 data dictionary. (“Application” is used here to mean “a collection of activities including interactions between different entities in the service of a collection of related goals and associated with a given IEEE Provider Service Identifier (PSID)”). Authenticity and integrity of the communications for these applications are ensured using digital signatures and IEEE 1609.2 digital certificates, which also indicate the permissions of the senders using Provider Service Identifiers (PSIDs) and Service Specific Permissions (SSPs). The PSID is a globally unique identifier associated with an application specification that unambiguously describes how to build interoperable instances of that application.

Recent developments in the commercialization of mobility services have brought unprecedented connectivity to the automotive sector. While the adoption of connected features provides significant benefits to vehicle owners, adversaries may leverage zero-day attacks to target the expanded attack surface and make unauthorized access to sensitive data. Protecting new generations of automotive controllers against malicious intrusions requires solutions that do not depend on conventional countermeasures, which often fall short when pitted against sophisticated exploitation attempts. In this paper, we describe some of the latent risks in current automotive systems along with a well-engineered multi-layer defense strategy. Further, we introduce a novel and comprehensive attack and performance test framework which considers state-of-the-art memory corruption attacks, countermeasures and evaluation methods.

Connected vehicles can provide data from multiple sensors that monitor both the vehicle and the environment through which the vehicle is passing. The data, when shared, can be used to enhance and optimize transportation operations and management—specifically, traffic flow and infrastructure maintenance. This document describes an interface between vehicle and infrastructure for collecting vehicle/probe data. That data may represent a single point in time or may be accumulated over defined periods of time or distance, or may be triggered based on circumstance. The purpose of this document is to define an interoperable means of collecting the vehicle/probe data in support of the use cases defined herein. There are many additional use cases that may be realized based on the interface defined in this document. Note that vehicle diagnostics are not included within the scope of this document, but diagnostics-related features may be added to probe data in a future supplemental document.

Abstract This work introduces the concept of a dual-layer specification structure for standards that separate interoperability functions, such as backward compatibility, localization, and deployment, from those essential to reliability, security, and functionality. The latter group of features, which constitute the actual standard, make up the baseline layer for instructions, while all the elements required for interoperability are specified in a second layer, known as a Protocols, Operations, Usage, and Formats (POUF) document. We applied this technique in the development of a standard for Uptane [1], a security framework for over-the-air (OTA) software updates used in many automobiles. This standard is a good candidate for a dual-layer specification because it requires communication between entities, but does not require a specific format for this communication.