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The development of highly automated driving functions (AD) recently rises the demand for so called Fail-Operational systems for native driving functions like steering and braking of vehicles. Fail-Operational systems shall guarantee the availability of driving functions even in presence of failures. This can also mean a degradation of system performance or limiting a system’s remaining operating period. In either case, the goal is independency from a human driver as a permanently situation-aware safety fallback solution to provide a certain level of autonomy. In parallel, the connectivity of modern vehicles is increasing rapidly and especially in vehicles with highly automated functions, there is a high demand for connected functions, Infotainment (web conference, Internet, Shopping) and Entertainment (Streaming, Gaming) to entertain the passengers, who should no longer occupied with driving tasks.

Strategies designed to deal with these challenges differ in the way in which added duties are assigned and cybersecurity topics are integrated into the already existing process steps. Cybersecurity requirements often clash with existing system requirements or established development methods, leading to low acceptance among developers, and introducing the need to have clear policies on how friction between cybersecurity and other fields is handled. ...Cybersecurity requirements often clash with existing system requirements or established development methods, leading to low acceptance among developers, and introducing the need to have clear policies on how friction between cybersecurity and other fields is handled. A cybersecurity development approach is frequently perceived as introducing impediments, that bear the risk of cybersecurity measures receiving a lower priority to reduce inconvenience. ...For an established development process and a team accustomed to this process, adding cybersecurity features to the product initially means inconvenience and reduced productivity without perceivable benefits.

This over view of the subject analyzes automotive cybersecurity threats that are gaining attention worldwide and the apparent ways industries are responding to them.

Its extensive application of data networks, including enhanced external digital communication, forced the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), for the first time, to set “Special Conditions” for cybersecurity. In the 15 years that ensued, airworthiness regulation followed suit, and all key rule-, regulation-, and standard-making organizations weighed in to establish a new airworthiness cybersecurity superset of legislation, regulation, and standardization. ...In the 15 years that ensued, airworthiness regulation followed suit, and all key rule-, regulation-, and standard-making organizations weighed in to establish a new airworthiness cybersecurity superset of legislation, regulation, and standardization. The resulting International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) resolutions, US and European Union (EU) legislations, FAA and European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) regulations, and the DO-326/ED-202 set of standards are already the de-facto, and soon becoming the official, standards for legislation, regulation, and best practices, with the FAA already mandating it to a constantly growing extent for a few years now—and EASA adopting the set in its entirety in July 2020.

On the other hand, the potential risks associated with CAV deployment related to technical vulnerabilities are safety and cybersecurity issues that may arise from flawed hardware and software. Cybersecurity and Digital Trust Issues in Connected and Automated Vehicles elaborates on these topics as unsettled cybersecurity and digital trust issues in CAVs and follows with recommendations to fill in the gaps in this evolving field. ...Cybersecurity and Digital Trust Issues in Connected and Automated Vehicles elaborates on these topics as unsettled cybersecurity and digital trust issues in CAVs and follows with recommendations to fill in the gaps in this evolving field. ...This report also highlights the importance of establishing robust cybersecurity protocols and fostering digital trust in these vehicles to ensure safe and secure deployment in our modern transportation system.

This increases the attractiveness of an attack on vehicles and thus introduces new risks for vehicle cybersecurity. Thus, just as safety became a critical part of the development in the late 20th century, the automotive domain must now consider cybersecurity as an integral part of the development of modern vehicles. ...Thus, just as safety became a critical part of the development in the late 20th century, the automotive domain must now consider cybersecurity as an integral part of the development of modern vehicles. Aware of this fact, the automotive industry has, therefore, recently taken multiple efforts in designing and producing safe and secure connected and automated vehicles. ...As the domain geared up for the cybersecurity challenges, they leveraged experiences from many other domains, but must face several unique challenges.

What standardization is needed to ensure that quantum technologies do not pose an unacceptable risk from an automotive cybersecurity perspective? Click here to access the full SAE EDGETM Research Report portfolio.

To build secure systems of road vehicles, the cybersecurity engineering standard ISO21434[11] suggests the evaluation of vulnerabilities throughout engineering process, such as attack path analysis, system requirement stage, software architecture, design, and implementation and testing phases. ...With my analysis and practices, it is appropriate to include the common vulnerabilities that ought to be an integral part of the automotive cybersecurity engineering process. In this paper, the author would like to provide a list of vulnerabilities that might be a suggestion for threat analysis and risk assessment and propose two solutions that may be adopted directly in the V-model for security-relevant software development.

Classic vehicle production had limitations in bringing the driving commands to the actuators for vehicle motion (engine, steering and braking). Steering columns, hydraulic tubes or steel cables needed to be placed between the driver and actuator. Change began with the introduction of e-gas systems. Mechanical cables were replaced by thin, electric signal wires. The technical solutions and legal standardizations for addressing the steering and braking systems, were not defined at this time. Today, OEMs are starting E/E-Architecture transformations for manifold reasons and now have the chance to remove the long hydraulic tubes for braking and the solid metal columns used for steering. X-by-wire is the way forward and allows for higher Autonomous Driving (AD) levels for automated driving vehicles. This offers new opportunities to design the vehicle in-cabin space. This paper will start with the introduction of x-by-wire technologies.

Abstract Automotive cybersecurity is steadily becoming a key factor in the worldwide adoption of connected and self-driving vehicles.

IOOs and ADS developers agree that cost, communications, interoperability, cybersecurity, operation, maintenance, and other issues undercut efforts to deploy a comprehensive connected infrastructure.

Additional complicating factors, such as cybersecurity concerns combined with a first responder’s legal authority, may pose challenges for traditional data collection.

As well, functional safety and cybersecurity constraints will increase. Electrification implies replacing energy from thermal sources with electricity from the wall and will include enhanced integration between sub-systems and components, along with higher speed in real time controls.

V2X signals are looking up

The automated vehicle industry has been busy designing, developing, and deploying several self driving vehicles and services in the last few years. However, much of the outcomes and the overall outlook of the vehicle and services, such as robotaxis, are not great. Customers and stakeholders complain that the level of automation is low, mostly SAE Levels 1, 2, and very little of Level 3. It appears that Level 4 is far out in the horizon and many wonder if Level 5 is actually achievable.

This document addresses the development of security material for application specifications in SAE V2X Technical Committees. The assumption in this document is that two groups with distinct missions contribute to the development of each standard: the “Application Specification Team is in charge of specifying the application functionality and the “Security Specification Team” is in charge of specifying the security. The two teams may, of course, have a significant overlap of members.

On-road vehicles equipped with driving automation features—where a human might not be needed for operation on-board—are entering the mainstream public space. However, questions like “How safe is safe enough?” and “What to do if the system fails?” persist. This is where remote operation comes in, which is an additional layer to the automated driving system where a human remotely assists the so-called “driverless” vehicle in certain situations. Such remote-operation solutions introduce additional challenges and potential risks as the entire vehicle-network-human now needs to work together safely, effectively, and practically. Unsettled Issues in Remote Operation for On-road Driving Automation highlights technical questions (e.g., network latency, bandwidth, cyber security) and human aspects (e.g., workload, attentiveness, situational awareness) of remote operation and introduces evolving solutions.

SAE is developing a number of standards, including the SAE J2945/x and SAE J3161/x series, that specify a set of applications using message sets from the SAE J2735 data dictionary. (“Application” is used here to mean “a collection of activities including interactions between different entities in the service of a collection of related goals and associated with a given IEEE Provider Service Identifier (PSID)”). Authenticity and integrity of the communications for these applications are ensured using digital signatures and IEEE 1609.2 digital certificates, which also indicate the permissions of the senders using Provider Service Identifiers (PSIDs) and Service Specific Permissions (SSPs). The PSID is a globally unique identifier associated with an application specification that unambiguously describes how to build interoperable instances of that application.

This course provides an overview of state-of-the-art intelligent vehicles, presents a systematic framework for intelligent technologies and vehicle-level architecture, and introduces testing methodologies to evaluate individual and integrated intelligent functions. Considering the increasing demand for vehicle intelligence, it is critical to gain an understanding of the growing variety of intelligent vehicle technologies and how they must function together effectively as a system.

Abstract Connected vehicle technology consisting of Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V) and Vehicle-to-Infrastructure (V2I) communication falls under the umbrella of V2X, or Vehicle-to-Everything, communication. This enables vehicles and infrastructure to exchange safety-related information to enable smarter, safer roads. If driver alerts are raised or automated action is taken as a result of these messages, it is critical that messages are trustworthy and reliable. To this end, the Security Credential Management System (SCMS) and Cooperative Intelligent Transportation Systems (C-ITS) Credential Management System (CCMS) have been proposed to enable authentication and authorization of V2X messages without compromising individual user privacy. This is accomplished by issuing each vehicle a large set of “pseudonyms,” unrelated to any real-world identity. During operation, the vehicle periodically switches pseudonyms, thereby changing its identity to others in the network.