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New for 2022, AeroTech® will deliver even more robust programming by teaming up with AeroMat to deliver learning opportunities dedicated to: Additive Manufacturing and Materials, Environment and Sustainable Aviation (Sustainability), Autonomy and AI, Safety and Human Factors, Modeling, Simulation and Testing, Cybersecurity / Cyber-Physical Security, Industry 4.0 Smart Manufacturing and Assembly, IDEAL Summit (inclusion, diversity, equity, accessibility and leadership), Advanced Air Mobility (AAM) and Multimodal Mobility (M3)

New for 2022, AeroTech® will deliver even more robust programming by teaming up with AeroMat to deliver learning opportunities dedicated to: Additive Manufacturing and Materials, Environment and Sustainable Aviation (Sustainability), Autonomy and AI, Safety and Human Factors, Modeling, Simulation and Testing, Cybersecurity / Cyber-Physical Security, Industry 4.0 Smart Manufacturing and Assembly, IDEAL Summit (inclusion, diversity, equity, accessibility and leadership), Advanced Air Mobility (AAM) and Multimodal Mobility (M3)

New for 2022, AeroTech® will deliver even more robust programming by teaming up with AeroMat to deliver learning opportunities dedicated to: Additive Manufacturing and Materials, Environment and Sustainable Aviation (Sustainability), Autonomy and AI, Safety and Human Factors, Modeling, Simulation and Testing, Cybersecurity / Cyber-Physical Security, Industry 4.0 Smart Manufacturing and Assembly, IDEAL Summit (inclusion, diversity, equity, accessibility and leadership), Advanced Air Mobility (AAM) and Multimodal Mobility (M3)

New for 2022, AeroTech® will deliver even more robust programming by teaming up with AeroMat to deliver learning opportunities dedicated to: Additive Manufacturing and Materials, Environment and Sustainable Aviation (Sustainability), Autonomy and AI, Safety and Human Factors, Modeling, Simulation and Testing, Cybersecurity / Cyber-Physical Security, Industry 4.0 Smart Manufacturing and Assembly, IDEAL Summit (inclusion, diversity, equity, accessibility and leadership), Advanced Air Mobility (AAM) and Multimodal Mobility (M3)

The purpose of this SAE Aerospace Information Report (AIR) is to provide guidance for aircraft engine and propeller systems (hereafter referred to as propulsion systems) certification for cybersecurity. Compliance for cybersecurity requires that the engine control, propeller control, monitoring system, and all auxiliary equipment systems and networks associated with the propulsion system (such as nacelle systems, overspeed governors, and thrust reversers) be protected from intentional unauthorized electronic interactions (IUEI) that may result in an adverse effect on the safety of the propulsion system or the airplane.

Abstract Aircraft cybersecurity efforts have tended to focus at the strategic or tactical levels without a clear connection between the two. ...CSSEP’s process model postulates that security is best achieved by a balance of cybersecurity, cyber resiliency, defensibility, and recoverability and that control is best established by developing security constraints versus attempting to find every vulnerability. ...CSSEP identifies the major functions needed to do effective aircraft cybersecurity and provides a flexible framework as the “missing link” to connect the strategic and tactical levels of aircraft cybersecurity.

Countering cybersecurity threats against unmanned vehicle systems Cranfield University researchers have developed a monitoring system whose purpose is to monitor mission profile implementation at both high level mission execution and at lower level software code operation to tackle specific threats of malicious code and possible spurious commands received over a vehicle's data links.

The SAE AS2C Standard AS5506C Architecture Analysis and Description Language (AADL) is a modeling language for predictive analysis of real-time software reliant, safety and cybersecurity critical systems that provides both the precision of formal modeling and the tool-agnostic freedom of a text-based representation. ...AADL supports multiple domains of architectural analysis such as timing, latency, resources, safety, scheduling, and cybersecurity. Adventium Labs conducted an exercise to determine the applicability of software engineering practices (e.g., continuous integration (CI), application programming interface (API) sharing, test driven development (TDD)) to the AADL-based Architecture Centric Virtual Integration Process (ACVIP).

Innovations in Mobility: Aerospace Digital Summitaerospace mobility leaders convene leverage cutting-edge technology, design, develop safety measures, integrate current regulations, suggest future policies, expand markets, diversify revenue streams.

This SAE Standard establishes practices to: a Manage risk and ensure security of a cyber-physical system (CPS) throughout its life cycle by utilizing systems engineering principles; b Assess the impact of cyber-physical systems security (CPSS) objectives and requirements; c Assess the security risks to CPS technical effectiveness and functions, and address weaknesses and vulnerabilities; d Address various domains of consideration (see 3.1) that take into account operating conditions of the system, command and control, configuration management (refer to SAE EIA649), etc., that could negatively impact CPSS or CPS-designed purpose; e Perform design validation and verification to assess security and risk of the CPS.

This document provides background and detailed technical information on existing methods to secure loadable software parts.

Cyber security in the aviation industry, especially in relation to onboard aircraft systems, presents unique challenges in its implementation and management. The cyber threat model is constantly evolving and will continually present new and different challenges to the aircraft operator in responding to new cyber threats without either invoking a lengthy software update and re-certification process or limiting aircraft-to-ground communications to the threatened system or systems. This presentation discusses a number of system architectural options and developing technologies that could be considered to enhance the aircraft cyber protection and defensive capabilities of onboard systems as well as to minimize the effort associated with certification/re-certification. Some of these limit the aircraft?s vulnerabilities or in cyber terms, its ?threat surface?.

This SAE Aerospace Recommended Practice (ARP) provides insights on how to perform a Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA) to determine the Return on Investment (ROI) that would result from implementing a blockchain solution to a new or an existing business process. The word “blockchain” refers to a method of documenting when data transactions occur using a distributed ledger with desired immutable qualities. The scope of the current document is on enterprise blockchain which gives the benefit of standardized cryptography, legal enforceability and regulatory compliance. The document analyzes the complexity involved with this technology, lists some of the different approaches that can be used for conducting a CBA, and differentiates its analysis depending on whether the application uses a public or a private distributed network.

Abstract Identity-Anonymized CAN (IA-CAN) protocol is a secure CAN protocol, which provides the sender authentication by inserting a secret sequence of anonymous IDs (A-IDs) shared among the communication nodes. To prevent malicious attacks from the IA-CAN protocol, a secure and robust system error recovery mechanism is required. This article presents a central management method of IA-CAN, named the IA-CAN with a global A-ID, where a gateway plays a central role in the session initiation and system error recovery. Each ECU self-diagnoses the system errors, and (if an error happens) it automatically resynchronizes its A-ID generation by acquiring the recovery information from the gateway. We prototype both a hardware version of an IA-CAN controller and a system for the IA-CAN with a global A-ID using the controller to verify our concept.

Upon their arrival, Unmanned Autonomous Systems (UAS) brought with them many benefits for those involved in a military campaign. They can use such systems to reconnoiter dangerous areas, provide 24-hr aerial security surveillance for force protection purposes or even attack enemy targets all the while avoiding friendly human losses in the process. Unfortunately, these platforms also carry the inherent risk of being built on innately vulnerable cybernetic systems. From software which can be tampered with to either steal data, damage or even outright steal the aircraft, to the data networks used for communications which can be jammed or even eavesdropped on to gain access to sensible information. All this has the potential to turn the benefits of UAS into liabilities and although the last decade has seen great advances in the development of protection and countermeasures against the described threats and beyond the risk still endures.

As cyber attacks become more frequent at all levels, the commercial aviation industry is gearing up to respond accordingly. Commercial Aviation and Cyber Security: A Critical Intersection is a timely contribution to those responsible for keeping aircraft and infrastructure safe. It covers areas of vital interest such as aircraft communications, next-gen air transportation systems, the impact of the Internet of Things (IoT), regulations, the efforts being developed by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), and other regulatory bodies. The book also collects important information on the best practices already adopted by other industries such as utilities, defense and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration in the US. It equally addresses risk management, response plans to cyber attacks, managing supply chains and their cyber- security flaws, personnel training, and the sharing of information among industry players.

This document applies to the development of Plans for integrating and managing COTS assemblies in electronic equipment and Systems for the commercial, military, and space markets; as well as other ADHP markets that wish to use this document. For purposes of this document, COTS assemblies are viewed as electronic assemblies such as printed wiring assemblies, relays, disk drives, LCD matrices, VME circuit cards, servers, printers, laptop computers, etc. There are many ways to categorize COTS assemblies1, including the following spectrum: At one end of the spectrum are COTS assemblies whose design, internal parts2, materials, configuration control, traceability, reliability, and qualification methods are at least partially controlled, or influenced, by ADHP customers (either individually or collectively). An example at this end of the spectrum is a VME circuit card assembly.