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COMVEC™ conference is the only North American event that addresses vehicles and equipment spanning on-highway, off-highway, agricultural, construction, industrial, military, and mining sectors.

Abstract Identity-Anonymized CAN (IA-CAN) protocol is a secure CAN protocol, which provides the sender authentication by inserting a secret sequence of anonymous IDs (A-IDs) shared among the communication nodes. To prevent malicious attacks from the IA-CAN protocol, a secure and robust system error recovery mechanism is required. This article presents a central management method of IA-CAN, named the IA-CAN with a global A-ID, where a gateway plays a central role in the session initiation and system error recovery. Each ECU self-diagnoses the system errors, and (if an error happens) it automatically resynchronizes its A-ID generation by acquiring the recovery information from the gateway. We prototype both a hardware version of an IA-CAN controller and a system for the IA-CAN with a global A-ID using the controller to verify our concept.

The lack of inherent security controls makes traditional Controller Area Network (CAN) buses vulnerable to Machine-In-The-Middle (MitM) cybersecurity attacks. Conventional vehicular MitM attacks involve tampering with the hardware to directly manipulate CAN bus traffic.

The basic requirements of AS9100A apply with the following clarifications. This document supplements the requirements of AS9100A for deliverable software. This supplement contains Quality System requirements for suppliers of products that contain deliverable embedded or loadable airborne, spaceborne or ground support software components that are part of an aircraft Type Design, weapon system, missile or spacecraft operational software and/or support software that is used in the development and maintenance of deliverable software. This includes the host operating system software including assemblers, compilers, linkers, loaders, editors, code generators, analyzers, ground simulators and trainers, flight test data reduction, etc., that directly support creation, test and maintenance of the deliverable software.

OBD, J1939 and UDS on CAN / IP), and a glimpse into the near future covering remote, cloud-based diagnostics and cybersecurity threats.

The 2022 COMVEC™ technical program focused on the commercial vehicle industry's crucial topics such as electrification, connectivity, off-highway, cybersecurity, autonomous and more!

The 2022 COMVEC™ technical program focused on the commercial vehicle industry's crucial topics such as electrification, connectivity, off-highway, cybersecurity, autonomous and more!

The researchers at the COE for Assured Autonomy in Contested Environments – all of which histories of innovation for Department of Defense problems of interest – will focus on the availability, integrity, and effective use of information by leveraging its diverse expertise in dynamics, mathematics, control theory, information theory, communications, and computer science.

As mobility software becomes increasingly complex and connected, so does the risk of human error and system safety. To combat this, New York-based software company AdaCore will work with Nvidia Corporation of Santa Clara, California to apply open-source Ada and SPARK programming languages for select software security firmware elements in highly-complex, safety-critical systems like Nvidia’s DRIVE AGX automated and autonomous vehicle solutions.

The 2022 COMVEC™ technical program focused on the commercial vehicle industry's crucial topics such as electrification, connectivity, off-highway, cybersecurity, autonomous and more!

Annual conference government policy, regulatory makers, automotive industry neutral forum discuss US government regulation, technology, customer acceptance future vehicle design. industry event safety, emission control, fuel efficiency, automated vehicles.

Abstract Heavy vehicles are essential for the modern economy, delivering critical food, supplies, and freight throughout the world. Connected heavy vehicles are also driven by embedded computers that utilize internal communication using common standards. However, some implementations of the standards leave an opening for a malicious actor to abuse the system. One such abuse case is a cyber-attack known as the “Address Claim Attack.” Proposed in 2018, this attack uses a single network message to disable all communication to and from a target electronic control unit, which may have a detrimental effect on operating the vehicle. This article demonstrates the viability of the attack and then describes the implementation of a solution to prevent this attack in real time without requiring any intervention from the manufacturer of the target devices. The defense technique uses a bit-banged Controller Area Network (CAN) filter to detect the attack.

Connected vehicles can provide data from multiple sensors that monitor both the vehicle and the environment through which the vehicle is passing. The data, when shared, can be used to enhance and optimize transportation operations and management—specifically, traffic flow and infrastructure maintenance. This document describes an interface between vehicle and infrastructure for collecting vehicle/probe data. That data may represent a single point in time or may be accumulated over defined periods of time or distance, or may be triggered based on circumstance. The purpose of this document is to define an interoperable means of collecting the vehicle/probe data in support of the use cases defined herein. There are many additional use cases that may be realized based on the interface defined in this document. Note that vehicle diagnostics are not included within the scope of this document, but diagnostics-related features may be added to probe data in a future supplemental document.

This Recommended Practice defines the technical requirements for a terrestrial-based PNT system to improve vehicle (e.g., unmanned, aerial, ground, maritime) positioning/navigation solutions and ensure critical infrastructure security, complementing GNSS technologies.

The new generation vehicles these days are managed by networked controllers. A large portion of the networks is planned with more security which has recently roused researchers to exhibit various attacks against the system. This paper talks about the liabilities of the Controller Area Network (CAN) inside In-vehicle communication protocol and a few potentials that could take due advantage of it. Moreover, this paper presents a few security measures proposed in the present examination status to defeat the attacks. In any case, the fundamental objective of this paper is to feature a comprehensive methodology known as Intrusion Detection System (IDS), which has been a significant device in getting network data in systems over many years. To the best of our insight, there is no recorded writing on a through outline of IDS execution explicitly in the CAN transport network system.

Laser Detecting Systems Enhancing Survivability and Lethality on the Battlefield Designing With Plastics for Military Equipment Engine Air-Brakes Paving the Way to Quieter Aircraft Nett Warrior Enhancing Battlefield Connectivity and Communications XPONENTIAL 2018 - An AUVSI Experience Communications in Space: A Deep Subject First Air-Worthy Metal-Printed RF Filter Ready for Takeoff Validation of Automated Prediction of Blood Product Needs Algorithm Processing Continuous Non-Invasive Vital Signs Streams (ONPOINT4) Using a combination of non-invasive sensors, advanced algorithms, and instruments built for combat medics could reduce hemorrhaging and improve survival rates. Calculation of Weapon Platform Attitude and Cant Using Available Sensor Feedback Successful development of mobile weapon systems must incorporate operation on sloped terrain.

Abstract Aircraft cybersecurity efforts have tended to focus at the strategic or tactical levels without a clear connection between the two. ...CSSEP’s process model postulates that security is best achieved by a balance of cybersecurity, cyber resiliency, defensibility, and recoverability and that control is best established by developing security constraints versus attempting to find every vulnerability. ...CSSEP identifies the major functions needed to do effective aircraft cybersecurity and provides a flexible framework as the “missing link” to connect the strategic and tactical levels of aircraft cybersecurity.

Upon their arrival, Unmanned Autonomous Systems (UAS) brought with them many benefits for those involved in a military campaign. They can use such systems to reconnoiter dangerous areas, provide 24-hr aerial security surveillance for force protection purposes or even attack enemy targets all the while avoiding friendly human losses in the process. Unfortunately, these platforms also carry the inherent risk of being built on innately vulnerable cybernetic systems. From software which can be tampered with to either steal data, damage or even outright steal the aircraft, to the data networks used for communications which can be jammed or even eavesdropped on to gain access to sensible information. All this has the potential to turn the benefits of UAS into liabilities and although the last decade has seen great advances in the development of protection and countermeasures against the described threats and beyond the risk still endures.