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This course will introduce participants to industry best practices for real-world aviation cyber-security risk-assessment, development & assurance. Participants will learn the information necessary to help minimize DO-326/ED-202-set compliance risks and costs, while also optimizing cyber-security levels for the development, deployment and in-service phases Topics such as aircraft security aspects of safety, systems-approach to security, security planning, the airworthiness security process, and security effectiveness assurance will be covered.

The UN R155 regulation is the first automotive cyber security regulation and has made security a mandatory approval criterion for new vehicle types. This establishes internationally harmonized security requirements for market approval. As a result, the application of the regulation presents manufacturers and suppliers with the challenge of demonstrating compliance. At process level the implementation of a Cyber Security Management System (CSMS) is required while at product level, the Threat Assessment and Risk Analysis (TARA) forms the basis to identify relevant threats and corresponding mitigation strategies. Overall, an issued type approval is internationally recognized by the member states of the UN 1958 Agreement. International recognition implies that uniform assessment criteria are applied to demonstrate compliance and to decide whether security efforts are sufficient.

Consequently, rise of this technological trend is bringing forth safety and cybersecurity challenges in form of new threats, hazards and vulnerabilities. As per the recent UN vehicle regulation 155, several risk-based security models and assessment frameworks have been proposed to counter the growing cybersecurity issues, however, the high budgetary cost to develop the tool and train personnel along with high risk of leakage of trade secrets, hinders the automotive manufacturers from adapting these third party solutions. ...As per the recent UN vehicle regulation 155, several risk-based security models and assessment frameworks have been proposed to counter the growing cybersecurity issues, however, the high budgetary cost to develop the tool and train personnel along with high risk of leakage of trade secrets, hinders the automotive manufacturers from adapting these third party solutions.

This method's detailed approach ensures that cybersecurity requirements can be readily implemented as a part of feature design, addressing the concerns of feature owners directly. ...This paper will discuss the merits of asset based approach to cybersecurity over attack based recognizing the inherent strengths and limitations of both methods and underscores the need for a unified approach.

Advanced Autonomous Vehicles (AV) for SAE Level 3 and Level 4 functions will lead to a new understanding of the operation phase in the overall product lifecycle. Regulations such as the EU Implementing Act and the German L4 Act (AFGBV) request a continuous field surveillance, the handling of critical E/E faults and software updates during operation. This is required to enhance the Operational Design Domain (ODD) during operation, offering Functions on Demand (FoD), by increasing software features within these autonomous vehicle systems over the entire digital product lifecycle, and to avoid and reduce downtime by a malfunction of the Autonomous Driving (AD) software stack.

Abstract In the pursuit of advancing autonomous vehicles (AVs), data-driven algorithms have become pivotal in replacing human perception and decision-making. While deep neural networks (DNNs) hold promise for perception tasks, the potential for catastrophic consequences due to algorithmic flaws is concerning. A well-known incident in 2016, involving a Tesla autopilot misidentifying a white truck as a cloud, underscores the risks and security vulnerabilities. In this article, we present a novel threat model and risk assessment (TARA) analysis on AV data storage, delving into potential threats and damage scenarios. Specifically, we focus on DNN parameter manipulation attacks, evaluating their impact on three distinct algorithms for traffic sign classification and lane assist.

3D, no waiting! Two companies' latest techniques take additive manufacturing to the next level. Reducing the battery materials supply risk "Adjacent" strategies such as improving vehicle efficiency and advancing promising chemistries can mitigate the risks associated with today's favored battery materials. A formula for real-world experience Student engineers soak up the lessons from an army of auto-industry and racing volunteers at Formula SAE Michigan. Editorial It's about more than a connector Supplier Eye The New Wild West SAE to standardize Tesla's NACS charging connector Report: Suppliers need more info sooner on OEM EV plans Mazda again producing rotary engines Toyota to build new battery lab in Michigan New Lexus SUVs: GX for show, TX for dough? VW introduces seminal ID.Buzz in three-row layout Spotlight: 3D Printing/Additive Manufacturing Equipment & Software

Finding solutions for Sustainable Mobility SAE created its SMS team to help industry rethink itself as part of the new industrial revolution and the EV transition within it. Debarbonizing the EV battery supply chain Altering manufacturing processes and using a much higher percentage of low emission energy can help the battery industry get greener rapidly, according to a new McKinsey & Co. report. Europe's dust buster The pending Euro 7 vehicle-emissions regulations include a significant new sustainability wrinkle: first-ever restrictions for PM emissions from brakes. E-fueling for the future The development of carbon-neutral e-fuels enjoyed a major boost from European regulators, but production cost and scale remain issues. Fuels to transition the global legacy fleet The EV bandwagon has obscured potential solutions for decarbon-izing the enormous global ICE legacy fleet.

The separation of cybersecurity considerations in RMTO is barely considered, as so far, most available research and activities are mainly focused on AV. ...The main focus of this paper is addressing RMTO cybersecurity utilising an adaptable security-by-design approach, although security-by-design is still in the infant state within automotive cybersecurity. ...The main focus of this paper is addressing RMTO cybersecurity utilising an adaptable security-by-design approach, although security-by-design is still in the infant state within automotive cybersecurity. An adaptable security-by-design approach for RMTO covers Security Engineering Life-cycle, Logical Security Layered Concept, and Security Architecture.

Additional complicating factors, such as cybersecurity concerns combined with a first responder’s legal authority, may pose challenges for traditional data collection.

As a result of the ever-increasing application of cyber-physical components in the automotive industry, cybersecurity has become an urgent topic. Adapting technologies and communication protocols like Ethernet and WiFi in connected vehicles yields many attack scenarios. ...Consequently, ISO/SAE 21434 and UN R155 (2021) define a standard and regulatory framework for automotive cybersecurity, Both documents follow a risk management-based approach and require a threat modeling methodology for risk analysis and identification. ...Initially, we transform cybersecurity guidelines to attack trees, and then we use their formal interpretations to assess the vehicle’s design.

To build secure systems of road vehicles, the cybersecurity engineering standard ISO21434[11] suggests the evaluation of vulnerabilities throughout engineering process, such as attack path analysis, system requirement stage, software architecture, design, and implementation and testing phases. ...With my analysis and practices, it is appropriate to include the common vulnerabilities that ought to be an integral part of the automotive cybersecurity engineering process. In this paper, the author would like to provide a list of vulnerabilities that might be a suggestion for threat analysis and risk assessment and propose two solutions that may be adopted directly in the V-model for security-relevant software development.

This specification establishes process controls for the repeatable production of aerospace parts by Laser Powder Bed Fusion (L-PBF). It is intended to be used for aerospace parts manufactured using Additive Manufacturing (AM) metal alloys, but usage is not limited to such applications.

R1T Exposed! A comprehensive teardown of Rivian's pioneering electric pickup reveals praiseworthy build quality, innovative thinking…and some lapses in manufacturability. EVs drive NVH materials innovation Skateboard platforms, high-frequency motor noise push lower dB thresholds and new countermeasure solutions. Optimizing design for additive manufacturing Avoiding the pitfalls of 3D printing requires knowing the process limitations - and how to work around them. An expert at a leading AM specialist shares insights on getting it right. Real-time processors help drive the zonal E/E revolution With its new generation of software-compatible processors, NXP aims to accelerate systems consolidation and performance.

Supplier Eye Inflation ignites another supplier squeeze Toyota reinvesting in collaborative safety research SAE and NREL partner to strengthen EV-charging cybersecurity Expanding the 'bubble' of cabin acoustics 2022 Ford F-150 Lightning redefines the pickup paradigm GM's Hummer EV is like nothing else

This document describes a process for use by ADHP integrators of EEE parts and sub-assemblies (items) that have been targeted for other applications. This document does not describe specific tests to be conducted, sample sizes to be used, nor results to be obtained; instead, it describes a process to define and accomplish application-specific qualification; that provides confidence to both the ADHP integrators, and the integrators’ customers, that the item will performs its function(s) reliably in the ADHP application.

With the rapid development of connected and autonomous vehicles, more sophisticated automotive systems running large portions of software and implementing a variety of communication interfaces are being developed. The ever-expanding codebase increases the risk for software vulnerabilities, while at the same time the large number of communication interfaces make the systems more susceptible to be targeted by attackers. As such, it is of utmost importance for automotive organizations to identify potential vulnerabilities early and continuously in the development lifecycle in an automated manner. In this paper, we suggest a practical approach for integrating fuzz testing into a Continuous Integration (CI) pipeline for automotive systems. As a first step, we have performed a Threat Analysis and Risk Assessment (TARA) of a general E/E architecture to identify high-risk interfaces and functions.

Additionally, we go beyond the attack vectors listed in UN-R155 - using our own analysis, experience and insights, we explored other attack vectors that will also affect vehicle cybersecurity.

In agriculture industry, increasing use of Vehicle Internet of Things (IoT), telematics and emerging technologies are resulting in smarter machines with connected solutions. Inter and Intra Communication with vehicle to vehicle and inside vehicle - Electronic Control Unit (ECU) to ECU or ECU (Electronic Control Unit) to sensor, requirement for flow of data increased in-turn resulting in increased need for secure communication. In this paper, we focus on functional verification and validation of secure Controller Area Network (CAN) for intra vehicular communication to establish confidentiality, integrity, authenticity, and freshness of data, supporting safety, advanced automation, protection of sensitive data and IP (Intellectual Property) protection. Network security algorithms and software security processes are the layers supporting to achieve our cause.

The underlying systems are susceptible to safety and cybersecurity attacks as the involved ECUs are interconnected. The security attacks can lead to disrupting the safe operation of the vehicle while causing injury to the passengers. ...Consequently, the functional safety requirements and cybersecurity requirements can be aligned with each other. In this article, a case study of the application of the THARA framework is presented through the risk analysis of safety and security threats applicable to the rearview camera (RVC) feature of the vehicle.